Rule of Thumb Consumers, Public Debt and Income Tax by Raffaele Rossi
Rule of Thumb Consumers, Public Debt and Income Tax￿
Ra⁄aele Rossiy
University of Glasgow
First draft: 5 August 2007
This draft: 4 December 2007
Abstract
This paper analyzes a New Keynesian model with Rule-of-Thumb consumers (ROTC) as in Gal￿ et
al.(2007) and a ￿scal policy which levies a proportional income tax. We ￿nd that, when the share of ROTC
is above a speci￿ed threshold and di⁄erently from the usual Leeper (1991) result, the determinacy condition
requires for both monetary and ￿scal policy to be either active of passive. Furthermore we show that the
introduction of a set of ROTC can reverse the traditional predictions of a change in government spending
on the economy as a whole: under a reasonable parametrization of the model, an increase in government
spending can lead, against the common Keynesian wisdom, to a decrease in total output. Finally we point
out that with the introduction of a distortive ￿scal policy and independently of the parametrization used,
private consumption responds negatively to a positive government spending shock.
JEL classi￿cation: E32; E62; H30
Keywords: Rule-of-thumb-consumers, monetary-￿scal policy interactions, distortive taxation, public spend-
ing, private consumption.
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In the last decade macroeconomic researchers have shown particular interest in the study of the relationship
between public spending and private consumption. Due to the fact that government spending is one of the
most important instruments of economic policy and private consumption is the main component of GDP,
understanding the relationship between these two variables is an important point for economic theorists as well
as for policy makers.
The original Keynesian theory pointed out that in the face of an increase in government spending (when
￿nanced with public debt), the current disposable income of private agents increases and therefore they consume
more. This theoretical prediction had been reversed in the late seventies by the Real Business Cycle approach
(RBC henceforth) in which private households, in￿nitely lived, maximize their lifetime utility. With this feature,
when government spending increases and independently of how this is ￿nanced, private consumers￿after tax
net income decreases, and as a consequence, they consume less.1 On the other hand, recent empirical work2
seem to contradict the RBC paradigm, ￿nding in the data a positive correlation between public and private
consumption.
A recent theoretical work by Gal￿, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) (GLV henceforth) tries to tackle this eco-
nomic puzzle, introducing in an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework (NK henceforth) with optimizing
agents, sticky prices and monopolistic competition in good markets, a set of Rule-of-thumb consumers (ROTC
henceforth) who are excluded from the ￿nancial markets and hence do not smooth consumption over time. The
main result of their work is that if we allow for the number of ROTC to be large enough in the economy, and
government expenditure to be partly ￿nanced with public debt, private consumption may increase in the face
of a positive government spending shock.
Due to its reasonable tractability and its policy implications, the GLV approach has received increased interest
in the literature. From this, one of the aspects most stressed is that the introduction of a set of ROTC in an
otherwise standard NK model can drastically change the determinacy conditions of the model.3 To this extent
the main contribution can be found in Bilbiie(2006). He shows that in a NK model with no capital accumulation,
a walrasian labour market and no ￿scal policy, a high share of ROTC may require for determinacy, using
Leeper￿ s (1991) de￿nition, a passive monetary policy (whereby nominal interest rate is adjusted such that real
rate decreases in response to positive in￿ ation). The basic intuition for this result is that when the monetary
authority increases the interest rate, the system experiences a downward pressure on wages. This, combined
with a sticky price environment implies an increase in pro￿ts which are held only by the optimizer consumers
(OPTC henceforth). The increase in OPTC wealth generated by the increase in pro￿ts may generate an increase
1See, inter alia, Baxter and King(1992).
2See inter alia Fatas and Mihov(2004), Blanchard and Perotti(1999) and Schmitt-Ghroe and Uribe(2007).
3See inter alia GLV(2004), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi(2006) and Bilbie(2006).
2in total demand putting, via the Phillips curve, upward pressure on prices. A monetary authority wishing to
stabilize the price level may therefore need to cut the real interest rate in the face of an in￿ ationary shock.
However all these works assume a neutral ￿scal policy. Government spending changes are therefore ￿nanced
by levying a lump-sum tax (i.e. changes in taxes do not have any consequences on the aggregate variables of
the model). As pointed out by Favero et al.(2005), this assumption is at odds with the reality. Linnemann
(2005) and Schmitt-Grhoe et al. (2006) show that the introduction of a more realistic distortive ￿scal policy
(i.e. proportional income tax), drastically changes the determinacy condition as well as the policy implications
of the model. The main reason is that changes in the tax rate cause a change in the consumers marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure. This implies that tax rate adjustments have a direct feedback
on the level of the aggregate variables.
The aim of this work is to extend the GLV analysis incorporating in a ROTC-NK model a distortive ￿scal
policy. From this point this paper makes two main contributions. The ￿rst is to check if the GLV results on the
positive correlation between public and private consumption survive with a richer characterization of the ￿scal
policy. The second is to fully describe which are the monetary-￿scal mix requirements for determinacy within
a NK model with ROTC and distortive taxation.
First of all, we show that the bifurcation point found by Bilbiie (2006), due to the non linear relationship
between ROTC and the sensitivity of the demand side of the economy (i.e. dynamic IS), for monetary policy, can
potentially be extended to ￿scal policy. In particular, when the share of ROTC is above a speci￿ed threshold,
an increase in government spending could, ceteris paribus, not only decrease private consumption but also total
output.
Second, we ￿nd that an active monetary policy which respects the Taylor principle (whereby the nominal
interest rate is adjusted such that the real rate increases in response to positive in￿ ation) can lead to a unique
equilibrium even with a high number of ROTC in the economy, as long as the ￿scal regime abandons its passive
role (whereby the tax rate increases in response to positive public debt shock), and adopts an active one.
Third, due to the presence of distortive taxation, and independently of the parametrization used, the positive
correlation between private and public spending is no longer a feature of the model.
The remainder of the paper is as follow. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the
determinacy analysis and the simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
32 The model
The totality of households is normalized to unity. Of this, a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) with ￿ ￿ 1; behave in a traditional
optimizing way. Hence they maximize their (in￿nite) lifetime utility, hold pro￿ts coming from the monopolistic
nature of the goods market, and participate in perfect and complete ￿nancial markets. The remaining ￿
households are de￿ned as in Gali et al.(2007). They care only for their current disposable income and they hold
no ￿nancial assets nor any pro￿t share. For these consumers all their wealth is represented by their wage and
therefore they cannot smooth consumption over time.
2.1 Optimizers (OPTC) (1 ￿ ￿)







Where u(:;:) represents instantaneous utility. We assume, in line with most of the literature, that du
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Where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, Co is the level of consumption of the OPTC, No is the OPTC labour
supply, ￿ > 0 indicates how leisure is valued relative to consumption. The parameter ’ > 0 is the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply and represents the risk aversion to variations in leisure.

























Where Pt (j) is the price level of the variety of good j, Wt is the nominal wage, Dt are the nominal pro￿ts
coming from the monopolistic competitive structure of the goods market,Bt+1 is the nominal payo⁄ of the one
period risk-less bond purchased at time t; Rt is the gross nominal return on bonds purchased in period t, Qt;t+1
is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payo⁄ and Vt is nominal payo⁄ of a state-contingent asset
portfolio. The government is assumed to pay a level of public spending, Gt and the service of debt, levying a
proportional income tax, ￿t: So is a steady state transfer such that at SS the two types of agents consume and
supply the same amount of labour.
The expenditure minimization problem implies that households, creating their consumption basket, exploit
any relative price di⁄erences present in the economy. This, combined with the CES Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,

















at the optimum we have Z 1
0
Pt (j)Co
t (j)dj = PtCo
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Where the parameter " represents the elasticity of substitution among goods and it is a measure of the market
power held by each ￿rm.




















Where Rt = 1
Et(Qt;t+1)is implied by the non arbitrage condition. This expression is the familiar Euler equation
for consumption. It describes the attitude to smooth consumption over time once the opportunity cost implied
by the real interest rate has been taken into account. The ￿rst order condition with respect to labour states








From the last expression one can see that taxation distorts the leisure-consumption choice. Any change in the
tax rate has a direct e⁄ect on real wage and therefore on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labour.
2.2 Rule of Thumb Consumers(ROTC) (￿)
The ROTC utility function is represented by a single period expression. In particular, following Gal￿ et al.(2007),








5As stressed above the ROTC do not participate in the ￿nancial markets and do not hold any pro￿t, therefore




t (j) = WtNr
t (1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ Sr (6)
Where Cr (j) and Nr are level of consumption of each product and labour supply of the ROTC. Furthermore,
it is assumed that as the OPTC, they exploit any relative price di⁄erence in creating their consumption basket.







On the consumption side the ROTC are forced to consume all their income in each period, therefore con-







(1 ￿ ￿t) (8)
The last two expressions state the ROTC "hand to mouth" attitude towards consumption. This means that
they consume in every period all their wealth which, as previously stated, is equal to their after tax labour
income. The optimal supply of labour takes the same analytical form as that of the OPTC.
2.3 Aggregation rules and market clearing condition
The aggregate expressions for consumption and labour are simply the weighted average of the single consumer
type variables. Therefore aggregate consumption follows
Ct = ￿Cr
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t (10)
In the absence of capital accumulation, everything produced must be consumed in the same period. Furthermore
each product can be purchased by the private sector(Ct) or by the government (Gt)
Yt (j) = Ct (j) + Gt (j) (11)
In aggregate
Yt = Ct + Gt (12)
62.4 Firms
In this economy, ￿rms are assumed to possess an identical production technology. This production function is
linear in labour and can be written as
Y (j) = N (j) (13)

















Following the NK literature it is assumed that prices are sticky. For the sake of simplicity, we model this
feature of the economy following the Calvo contracts (1983). In each period there is a (randomly selected) set
of ￿rms, let￿ s say (1 ￿ ￿); who reset their price optimally, while the remaining ￿ keep their prices ￿xed. When
a ￿rm is allowed to reset its prices, it takes into account the expected future stream of pro￿ts discounted for














Yt+i (j) ￿ MCt+iYt+i (j)
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The government uses income tax revenues, Pt￿tYt to ￿nance a stream of public spending, PtGt
4 , and the service
of public debt. Therefore the government budget constraint can be expressed as
R￿1
t Bt+1 = Bt ￿ Pt￿tYt + PtGt (19)
4As the private sector, the government exploit any price di⁄erences in the market to form its consumption basket Gt: This jointly
















￿ ￿tYt + Gt (20)
2.6 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy ￿xes the nominal interest rate, Rt; in every period. Its only aim is price stability. Following
Clarida et al.(2000), it is assumed that the monetary authority responds only to current in￿ ation. The monetary
policy rule can therefore be expressed as follow
Rt = R + ￿￿t (21)
Where R = 1
￿ is the steady state interest rate and ￿ is the policy parameter that identi￿es the response of the
interest rate to the in￿ ation rate.
2.7 Fiscal Policy
For the ￿scal policy we assume a government revenues rule of the type
Yt￿t = ￿0 + ￿1
￿
B
(Bt ￿ B) + ￿2
￿
Y
(Yt ￿ Y ) (22)
where ￿0 = (1 ￿ ￿)B + G and ￿1 and ￿2 are policy parameters identifying the relative weight given to debt
stabilization and output stabilization. This ￿scal rule has the characteristic of being SS neutral (at steady state
the ￿scal rule collapses to ￿ =
(1￿￿)B
Y + G
Y which is equal to ￿ = ￿0=Y ) and it permits the analysis, following
Leeper (1991), from the active-passive policy perspective.
2.8 Log Linearization
This section presents a log-linearized version of the model around the non stochastic steady state (SS).5 Hence-





While ￿t = logPt ￿ logPt￿1 identi￿es the in￿ ation rate.
The log linearization of the OPTC Euler equation and optimal supply of labour are
b Co
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5Detailed description of the SS in Appendix A
8while the ROTC consumption and labour follow
b Cr
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Log linearizing (17) and (18) around a zero in￿ ation SS yields to the traditional New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC)
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿( d MCt ￿ b Pt) (27)
Where ￿ =
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ : The log linearization of the aggregation rules for consumption and labour yield
b Ct = ￿b Cr
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b Co
t (28)
b Nt = ￿ b Nr
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b No
t (29)
while the market clearing condition follows
b Yt = ￿c b Ct + (1 ￿ ￿c) b Gt (30)
where ￿c = C
Y . Furthermore from the production function (13)
b Yt = b Nt (31)
The log linearization of the monetary and ￿scal rule yields
b Rt = ￿￿t (32)
b ￿t = ￿1 b Bt + (￿2 ￿ 1)b Yt
:Finally, a log linearization of the government budget constraint can be written as















This section presents the equilibrium of the model. Further analysis is simpli￿ed by rewriting the model as a
function of aggregate variables only. First, combining (25) with (26), we obtain
b Nr
t = 0 (34)
9and
b Cr




From the last two expressions one can see that the introduction of distortive taxation is completely internalized
in the ROTC consumption, while their labour supply remains constant at the SS level6. Therefore changes in
the tax rate over the business cycle do not have any e⁄ect on the ROTC labour supply.
Combining the last expression with the optimal labour supply of the OPTC yields
b Co
t + ’ b No
t = b Cr
t (36)
Furthermore, combining (29) with (34) it is possible to rewrite the total supply of labour as
b Nt = (1 ￿ ￿) b No
t (37)
Therefore aggregate labour ￿ uctuations are just a function of changes in OPTC labour supply. Moreover,
plugging these results into the equation for total consumption yields








+ (1 ￿ ￿) b Co
t
Simplifying gives





From the latter we can rewrite the Euler equation in terms of aggregate consumption as











Et￿ b Nt+1 (39)
As in Gal￿ et al(2007) we ￿nd it useful to iterate forward the last expression such that
b Ct = ’
￿
1 ￿ ￿




b Rt+i ￿ ￿t+i+1
￿
(40)
From the last expression it is easy to see that an increase in public spending has the potential to increase
private consumption. The intuition is straightforward. An increase in b Gt, given any path of future interest rate
and in￿ ation, through the market clearing condition, generates an increase in total output, and therefore in the
demand of labour. The increase in labour demand has a direct and positive e⁄ect on the real wage. An increase
in the real wage boosts ROTC consumption and therefore potentially total consumption. From the formula it
is clear that the multiplier e⁄ect on consumption is greater, the higher the share of ROTC. However, something
is missing from this apparently strong result. The problem lies in the fact that b Nt is not truly exogenous to b Ct:
6For the ROTC the substitution e⁄ect on the labour supply is equal to the income e⁄ect.
10On the contrary, total labour demand and therefore total output are functions of private consumption as well
as of public spending. To have the full picture it is necessary to substitute in (40) the market clearing condition
and the production function. The resulting equation can be expressed as follows































b Rt+i ￿ ￿t+i+1
￿
(41)
It is clear from the last equation the precise multiplier of public spending on private consumption is represented
by the term
￿
1 ￿ ’ ￿
1￿￿￿c
￿￿1
: The multiplier depends directly and in a non linear way on ￿: In particular a
necessary condition to have d b C
d b G > 0 requires
￿ < (1 + ’￿c)
￿1 (42)
A few points are worth stressing. First, for high level of ￿ or high values of ’ (inelastic labour supply)
an increase in public spending decreases private consumption. The intuition is as follows: when there is an
increase in government spending, there is an increase in labour demand and as a consequence an increase in
real wage. This generates an increase in ROTC consumption. At the same time higher real wages imply lower
pro￿ts, which are held only by the OPTC. For each unit of decrease in pro￿t, the OPTC￿ s receive 1
1￿￿ > 1
less pro￿ts. When ￿ is above the threshold, the negative e⁄ect on pro￿t overcompensates the boost in ROTC
consumption, generating a negative relationship between public and private spending. This is not all. This























b Rt+i ￿ ￿t+i+1
￿
(43)
From the latter, one can see that when ￿ is above the threshold there is a negative correlation which a⁄ects
not just private consumption but the entire aggregate demand. Therefore, and in contrast with most of the
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium literature, the presence of ROTC could generate a situation where
db Yt
d b Gt
< 0. The initial increase in labour demand generates a contemporaneous and expected decrease in OPTC
income which is greater than the boost in ROTC consumption and than the public spending increase put
together. The initial increase in labour demand is overturned by the decrease in OPTC wealth. This will have
a contractionary e⁄ect on the labour demand which is greater than the one generated by an increase in b Gt:
Moreover, it is interesting to note that this result is completely independent of the type of ￿scal policy present
11in the economy.
The second important point regards the e⁄ect of an increase in the real interest rate on the economy as a
whole. As pointed out by Bilbiie (2006), when ￿ is above the threshold described above, an increase in the
real interest rate can potentially generate an increase in aggregate demand. As a consequence, in order for
monetary policy to achieve price stabilization it may have a passive policy rule7. The reason is as follows. First
of all, an increase in the real rate makes OPTC￿ s current consumption decrease through the Euler equation. As
a consequence, there is a downward shift in labour demand and a reduction in real wages. ROTC disposable
income is reduced and therefore b Cr
t decreases. Nevertheless, a fall in real wages generates an increase in pro￿ts.
As stressed above, a unit of increase in pro￿t generates 1
1￿￿ increase in OPTC wealth. When the share of
ROTC is high enough (or equally labour supply is inelastic), this e⁄ect on pro￿ts may overturn the reduction in
aggregate demand generated through the Euler equation. Furthermore, an increase in the interest rate causes
a greater upward shift in the demand for bonds than in a situation with no ROTC. This is because in this
framework public debt is net wealth (i.e. both consumers pay the service of public debt but only the OPTC
hold bonds). Again, for each unit of increase in real interest rate the OPTC consumers receive Rt
1
1￿￿ units of
wealth, thus increasing the possibility of an expansion in aggregate demand.
On the supply side, using the market clearing condition and the de￿nition of real marginal cost, we can express
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in terms of aggregate variables as follows















3 The model in action
This section analyzes the determinacy conditions and the calibration results of the model.
First of all it is important to have a full description of the policy mix, monetary and ￿scal, that guarantees a
unique equilibrium when ￿, the share of ROTC consumers, is above and below the threshold introduced in the
previous section. As stressed by Bilbiie (2006), for ￿ above the threshold, the system needs a passive monetary
policy in order to have a unique equilibrium, whilst, the opposite is true when ￿ is smaller than the threshold.
This important result is here integrated with a distortive ￿scal policy.
The second important goal of this section is to check, using a similar parametrization as in Gal￿ et al.(2007)
augmented with distortive taxation, the behavior of private consumption in the face of a government spending
shock. This point is not trivial. With distortive ￿scal policy a change in the tax rate has direct feed back on
the endogenous variables of the model. In particular, as discussed above, an increase in the tax rate generates,
ceteris paribus, a decrease in total output and in private consumption. For this reason, when the Ricardian
equivalence does not hold, the government budget constraint cannot be separated from the rest of model as long
7We de￿ne passive monetary policy as in Leeper (1991). Passive monetary policy is such that it responds to the in￿ ation rate
by increasing the nominal interest rate by less than one. In the context of this model, a passive rule implies ￿ < 1:
12as the timing of how the public sector decides to ￿nance its spending has direct consequences on the endogenous
variables of the model.
3.1 Calibration
This section discusses the parameters values chosen for the determinacy analysis and the calibration of the
model. We assume the elasticity of substitution among goods, ", is equal to 6. This implies a SS real wage is
equal to 0:83 and a SS markup of 20%, which is in line with the literature. The discount factor ￿ has been
￿xed at 0:99. As a consequence, the gross annual interest rate is 3%. ￿, the parameter of relative disutility of
labour to consumption, has been chosen to obtain an average SS labour supply of 1=3. The SS ratio between
private consumption and total output, ￿c; is 0:75. This value implies a SS ratio G=Y of 0:25 which is in line
with the level of public consumption of most of the industrialized countries. The ratio between the SS annual
stock of public debt and the annual GDP is ￿xed at 0:6, which is the average of the ratio of public debt to
GDP of most industrialized countries. This in turn means that the SS level of the tax rate is equal to 30%
and ￿b = B=Y being equal to 2:4: As most of the NK literature, we assume that prices remain unchanged on
average for one year. Therefore ￿, the parameter ruling the degree of price stickiness, is ￿xed at 0:75. The
stochastic component of the model is represented by a government spending shock. In particular we assume
that government spending follows an exogenous and stationary AR(1) process of the type b Gt = ￿b Gt￿1+￿t with
￿ ￿a i:i:d:N (0;1) and ￿ = 0:9. The determinacy and consequently the calibration exercise has been studied
with di⁄erent values of ￿2, the ￿scal policy parameter of the output gap. A value of ￿2 = 0 implies a policy
rule very similar to the one studied by Leeper (1991), and describes a situation in which the total government
revenues do not respond to output ￿ uctuations. To study a countercyclical ￿scal policy in terms of output, ￿2
has been ￿xed at 2 . The model has been solved with two pairs of ￿ and ’: One of these (￿ = 0:3, ’ = 1)
guarantees for the model to be consistent with the Keynesian logic, whilst the other (￿ = 0:5, ’ = 3), reverses
the Keynesian logic. Similarly, in order to describe the active-passive policy mix, the determinacy condition is
analyzed for a broad range of policy parameters, ￿ and ￿1:
13Table 1 : Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
￿ 0:99 Discount factor
￿ 0:5 Share of ROTC
￿2 2;0 Fiscal parameter on the output gap
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among goods
￿c 0:75 Steady state share of C=Y
￿ 3 Relative weight of disutility of labour
’ 1 Frisch inverse elasticity of labour supply
￿ 0:75 Degree of price stickiness
￿b 2:4 Annual ratio public debt to GDP
￿ 0:9 Persistence of the public spending shock
3.2 Results
Figure (1) shows the combination of ￿ and ’ that guarantee the validity of the Taylor principle and the positive
correlation, ceteris paribus, between public spending and total output. As previously stated we refer to this
area as the Keynesian side of the economy which is consistent with low values of ￿ and high values of ’ (i.e.
low share of ROTC and inelastic labour supply) or with high values of ￿ and low values of ’ (high share of
ROTC and elastic labour supply).
Within this side of the economy, the determinacy of equilibrium requires, as shown by Leeper (1991), a
particular mix of monetary and ￿scal policy. In particular a monetary policy wishing to stabilize in￿ ation
(active monetary policy) must be complemented by a ￿scal policy which adjusts tax revenues in order to
stabilize public debt (passive ￿scal policy). On the other side if the ￿scal authority does not stabilize the stock
of public debt (active ￿scal policy), determinacy requires monetary policy to forsake price stabilization (passive
monetary policy). In the context of this model, an active monetary policy requires for ￿ to be greater than one
(equivalently called Taylor principle), whilst a passive ￿scal policy needs ￿1 to be positive.
Figure (2) shows, given a combination of ￿ and ’ that leaves the economy Keynesian (￿ = 0:3, ’ = 1),
the mix of monetary and ￿scal policy parameters that leads to a unique equilibrium.8 As stressed before, the
active passive policy mix required for equilibrium is as in Leeper (1991). The reason is now well known. Let us
consider a Keynesian economy facing a government spending shock. At the time of the shock aggregate output
increases.9 This leads, through the NKPC, to upward pressure on in￿ ation. The active interest rule results in
monetary policy increasing the nominal rate by more than the in￿ ation rate. This increase on one hand makes
today consumption more expansive, causing a downward shift on the aggregate demand, and on the other hand
8Appendix A conteins the details of the determinacy analysis.
9Note that at the moment nothing is said about the nature of the ￿scal policy.
14raises the demand for bonds. The overall result is a stabilization of price level and an increase in the cost
of serving public debt. In order to repay this cost the ￿scal authority must raise tax revenues (passive ￿scal
policy).
Figure (3) reports the impulse response function (IRF) of the variables of the model in the face of a government
spending shock within the Keynesian side of the economy, with an active monetary policy (￿ = 1:2) and a passive
￿scal policy(￿1 = 0:2). The policy parameter on output gap ￿2 takes here the value of 0 that corresponds to
a neutral, in terms of output, ￿scal rule and the value of 2 which corresponds to a countercyclical, always in
terms of output, ￿scal policy.
At the time of the shock there is an expansion in aggregate demand, generated by an increase in total output.
Through the NKPC, this leads to an upward pressure on prices resulting in positive in￿ ation rate. The monetary
authority, following an active rule, raises the nominal interest rate more than the in￿ ation rate.
On the government side, the public spending shock worsens the government budget constraint, which is
therefore balanced with the emission of public debt. The increase in interest rate, increasing the real return on
bonds, makes the OPTC willing to purchase all the public debt assets present on the market, while the (passive)
￿scal authority repays the cost of this service, raising the (distortive) income tax rate.
Due to the distortive nature of the ￿scal policy, any increase in the tax rate generates a decrease in disposable
income and therefore in total output. At this point it is convenient to make a distinction between the two types
of consumer. The ROTC￿ s supply labour as they always were at SS10. Therefore any changes in disposable real
wage are internalized by their consumption. As a consequence, an increase in tax rate (a decrease in disposable
income) translates to a direct decrease in ROTC consumption.
For the OPTC the situation is more complicated. They maximize the stream of their lifetime utility. Hence,
when a government spending shock occurs, and independently on how this is ￿nanced, their expected after tax
disposable income decreases and therefore they consume less. However, due to the tendency of the government
to balance its budget with public debt, which now, purchased only by OPTC, is net wealth (both consumers
pay the service of debt but only the OPTC hold public debt assets), the decrease in OPTC consumption, caused
by the present and expected future raise in the tax rate, is smaller than in a situation with no ROTC.
Similarly, an increase in the interest rate makes OPTC present consumption more expansive. At the same
time it raises the return on bond and potentially, through a downward pressure on real wages, increases the
pro￿t rate. Again the overall reduction in OPTC present consumption determined by a higher real interest rate
is smaller than a situation with no ROTC.
The weaker impact of monetary and ￿scal instruments on this economy may help to explain the high persis-
tence of the variables of this model (i.e. the smaller the impact of the policy, the slower is the convergence to
the SS value). The system takes in fact approximately 50 quarters, more than 12 years, to return to the steady
state level.
As one can see from Figure (3), the di⁄erence between a ￿scal policy which is neutral (￿2 = 0) or countercyclical
10See note 6.
15(￿2 = 2) is almost irrelevant. The joint e⁄ect of the need to balance the government budget constraint with
the increase in the real interest rate and the net wealth characteristic of public debt causes, when b Gt increases,
a greater response in bonds than in output. As a consequence (passive ￿scal policy), and independently of ￿2;
the tax rate has to increase, generating a similar e⁄ect on the dynamics of the model under the two di⁄erent
speci￿cations of the ￿scal rule.
Figures (4) and (5) show the monetary-￿scal policy mix that guarantee a unique equilibrium in the non-
Keynesian side of the economy. In particular, in ￿gure (4) the ￿scal rule has a neutral behavior in terms of
output (￿2 = 0), while the second ￿gure sketches the equilibrium condition on the policy parameters with a
countercyclical ￿scal policy (￿2 = 2). In this side of the economy, the particular mix that guarantees equilibrium
requires for both policies to be either active or to be passive. The intuition for this result is as follows: when
the combination of ￿ and ’ is such that the Keynesian logic is inverted, a monetary policy wishing to stabilize
the price level needs to adopt a passive rule. Ceteris paribus, such a policy implies a potential decrease in the
real interest rate. This would push upward OPTC present consumption and therefore the demand for bonds,
increasing the stock of public debt. In order to stabilize the system a sound ￿scal policy needs to raise taxation
(passive ￿scal policy). Alternatively, if the ￿scal authority does not stabilize the stock of debt (active policy) the
equilibrium condition needs for the monetary authority to increase the real rate (active policy). Doing so, given
the positive e⁄ect of interest rates on the return of bonds and on pro￿ts, total output and consequently in￿ ation
would increase, de￿ ating the cost of public debt. As one can see from Figure (4), a countercyclical ￿scal policy
is consistent with the active-active policy mix, while it reduces the determinacy area in the passive-passive
policy mix. In particular, given a passive monetary policy, determinacy requires a very mild or a very strong
passive ￿scal policy.
Figure (6) presents the IRF when both policies are active (￿ = 1:2, ￿1 = ￿0:2). Let us ￿rst analyze a neutral
￿scal policy in terms of output (￿2 = 0). At the time of the shock, b Gt increases and therefore, given the negative
multiplier of public spending on output, b Yt decreases. Through the NKPC, in￿ ation decreases. Monetary policy
cuts the interest rate more than the in￿ ation rate, generating a decrease in the real interest rate. This causes
a decrease in the demand for bond. The (active) ￿scal policy raises the tax rate putting further downward
pressure on total output. As a result, wages decrease, generating a reduction in labour income. The reduction
in ROTC￿ s wealth is directly transferred to their consumption level. This is not all. Due to the presence of sticky
prices (and simultaneously perfectly ￿ exible wages), wages decrease more than prices, generating a potential
increase in pro￿ts. Furthermore, the decrease in the real rate makes OPTC present consumption cheaper. From
the simulation, it appears that these two e⁄ects overcome the reduction of wealth, given by a higher tax rate,
su⁄ered by the OPTC, pushing their consumption upward. Nevertheless, as one can see, the increase in OPTC
consumption is smaller, in absolute value, than the decrease in ROTC consumption. As a result, aggregate
consumption decreases.
In this context, and di⁄erently from the Keynesian side of the economy, a countercyclical ￿scal rule (￿2 = 2)
changes in a non trivial way the impact on the model of a government spending shock. The initial decrease in
16total output generated by the increase in b Gt; is more than compensated by a countercyclical ￿scal policy. As
a result, total output increases over the SS level. This, ceteris paribus, generates an upward pressure on the
in￿ ation rate and therefore, given an active monetary policy, on the real rate. Wages increase more than prices
generating an increase in the present after-tax labour income and a decrease in pro￿ts. As a consequence, there
is a boost in ROTC consumption. The reduction in pro￿t rate causes a decrease in wealth of the OPTC which
is greater than the increase in after-tax labour income, and in the increased opportunity cost of purchasing
bonds. Moreover, OPTC present consumption, given an higher interest rate, is now more expansive. As a
result, OPTC consume less and purchase fewer bonds.
Furthermore, in this context a countercyclical ￿scal policy seems, from the simulation of the model, to have
a fundamental stabilization role in the economy. In fact, as is clear from Figure (6), with such a ￿scal policy
the deviation of the variables from their SS values is much smaller than with a neutral ￿scal rule.
Figure (7) shows the IRF in the case where both policies are passive. In order to have a combination of
policy parameters that leads to determinacy with both speci￿cations of ￿scal rule (i.e. ￿2 = 0 and ￿2 = 2), ￿;
the parameter of monetary policy has been ￿xed at 0:8 while ￿1 = 0:1: When a government spending shock
hits the system, aggregate output falls, leading to downward pressure on prices and consequently to a negative
in￿ ation rate. Given a passive monetary rule, nominal interest rates fall less than in￿ ation generating an
increase in real rate. This makes the OPTC demand more bonds. Hence public debt increases. The passive
￿scal authority raises the tax rate, generating a further decrease in total output. The combined e⁄ect of a
lower labour demand and a higher tax rate makes after-tax disposable income drop. As a consequence, ROTC
consumption decreases. Due to sticky prices, wages decrease more than in￿ ation, generating an increase in
pro￿ts and therefore an increase in wealth for the OPTC. However, from the simulation it appears, that the
increase in wealth generated by a higher interest rate (bond channel) and higher pro￿ts is dominated by the
decrease in present and future labour income wealth, due to the present and expected increases in the tax rate
and by the intertemporal allocation (higher interest rate). Therefore OPTC consumption decreases. However,
as one can see from Figure (7), these opposite economic e⁄ects make OPTC consumption return to its SS level
quicker (around 10 quarters) than ROTC consumption (around 50 quarters).
The di⁄erence between a neutral and a countercyclical ￿scal policy is very small. This is due to the greater
impact (and therefore a bigger tax increase) of the public spending shock on debt than on output.
Colciago (2007) has pointed out that the results of Gal￿ et al.(2007) were dependent on an ad hoc calibration of
’ (0:2), the parameter of risk aversion in leisure. In particular, the author points out that the positive correlation
between public and private consumption does not hold for higher values of ’:In this exercise we show that,
even using the same parametrization as in Gali￿et al.(2007)11 ,within a model with distortive ￿scal policy the
correlation between public and private consumption is negative. The results are displayed in Figure(8). The
combination of ￿ and ’ (0:5;0:2) guarantees the economy to be in the Keynesian side. Hence, as in Figure
(3) monetary policy is active while ￿scal policy is passive. The mechanism of the model is similar to the one
11Detailed explanation of the calibration used in Gali￿et al. can be found in Appendix B.
17discussed for Figure(3). The main intuition is that independently of ’, the distortive nature of ￿scal policy
imposes a change in the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and, as stressed above,
these changes are completely internalized in ROTC consumption. In particular for each increase in public
expenditure and a passive ￿scal policy, the tax rate must somehow increase, generating a decrease in ROTC
consumption. This, combined with the traditional RBC prediction of a negative correlation between OPTC
consumption and public spending, causes a decrease in overall consumption.
184 Conclusions
In this paper we add to the traditional closed economy New Keynesian model with sticky prices and monopolistic
competition in the goods market, a set of Rule of Thumb Consumers as in Gal￿ et al.(2007), distortive income
taxation and steady state public debt. We show that the introduction of ROTC generates a non linear sensitivity
of aggregate demand not only, as described by Bilbiie (2006), to the interest rate, but also to government
spending. In particular when the share of ROTC is above a threshold, an increase in public spending can
potentially generate a decrease in total output.
Moreover, we show that when there is a negative correlation between government spending and total output
an active monetary policy is consistent with a unique determinate equilibrium as long as the ￿scal authority
changes from passive to active. This can be interpreted as an answer to a recent empirical work by Favero &
Monacelli (2005) where they show that since the late seventies an active monetary policy has been mixed with
an active ￿scal one.
Ultimately we ￿nd that the introduction of a non neutral ￿scal instrument with a share of ROTC generates, for
all the simulation experiments we run, a negative correlation between public spending and private consumption.
These results challenge researchers to ￿nd a robust theoretical model which would better explain the positive
correlation found in the data between public spending and private consumption.
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21Appendix A
This section describes the steady state of the model. A few points are worth stressing. First of all, we impose,
through a transfer, that the two agents have the same level of consumption and supply the same level of labour
at SS. Hence the heterogeneity between the two consumers is only along the business cycle. Price are normalized
to unity and we ￿x G







(1 ￿ ￿) +
￿
1 ￿ R￿1￿ B
1 ￿ ￿
+ So (45)
Where So is the OPTC transfer. The SS ROTC budget constraint is
Cr = (WNr)(1 ￿ ￿) + Sr (46)
where Sr is the ROTC transfer. Furthermore we need to impose
(1 ￿ ￿)So + ￿Sr = 0 (47)




While the SS pro￿ts follow
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The SS government budget constraint can be written as
￿Y = (1 ￿ ￿)B + G (52)
22Given that C
Y = ￿c ,G
Y = (1 ￿ ￿c) and that B
Y = ￿b we can rewrite the last equation as
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿b + (1 ￿ ￿c) (53)
Combining the fact that at SS Y = N with the SS optimal labour supply it yields
￿￿c (N)
’+1 = W (1 ￿ ￿) (54)
After rearranging, the latter yields the SS level of labour supply
Y = N =
￿






G = (1 ￿ ￿c)Y
C = ￿cY
These equations give us to have a full description of the SS variables. A few points are worth mentioning.
First of all the SS level of output is ine¢ cient. This is due to the monopolistic competition nature of the
good markets, to the distortive nature of ￿scal policy taxation and to an (ine¢ ciently) high level of public
expenditure. From (55) the negative correlation between tax rate and output is clear. An increase in public
spending or ceteris paribus an increase in public debt requires a higher level of tax rate (53) and this, in turn,
lowers the level of output.
Appendix B
For determinacy purposes the dynamic system can be represented as follow












￿t = ￿1 b Bt + (￿2 ￿ 1)b Yt (57)








b Rt ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
(58)
b Rt = ￿￿t (59)








b Yt + ￿t
￿￿
(60)
As one can notice, public spending has been omitted from these sets of equations. The reason is that b Gt
follow a stationary AR(1) process and therefore does not a⁄ect the determinacy conditions.
Substituing (59) into (58) and (57) into (56) and (60), one obtains a system of three equations.
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Blanchard and Khan (1981), determinacy requires for H to have two eigenvalues outside the unit circle and one
inside the unit circle.
Appendix B
This section presents the results of the Gali￿et Al.(2007) model with no capital perfectly competitive labour
market. Ceteris paribus, the notation is equivalent to the model presented above.
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subject to the sequence of budget constraints
PtCo
t + R￿1
t Bt+1 = WtPtNo
t + Bt + Dt ￿ PtTo
t (62)


























































t Wt = PtCr
t + PtTr
t (69)

















t + (1 ￿ ￿)Co
t (73)
and aggregate labour supply
Nt = ￿Nr
t + (1 ￿ ￿)No
t (74)
and the total government revenues from tax collection
Tt = ￿Tr
t + (1 ￿ ￿)To
t (75)
and the total output
Yt = Ct + Gt (76)
Monetary Policy
We assume the monetary authority ￿x the nominal interest rate in each period following the rule
rt = r + ￿￿￿t (77)
where rt ￿ Rt ￿ 1, r is the steady state interest rate, and ￿￿ > 1 for the Taylor principle.
Fiscal Policy
The government budget constraint is
PtTt + R￿1
t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (78)
now letting b Tt = (Tt ￿ T)=Y , b Gt =
(Gt￿G)






=Y we assume a simple ￿scal rule of the
type
tt = ￿b b Bt + ￿g b Gt (79)
with ￿band ￿g positive.
26Furthermore we assume that the variable b Gt follow an AR(1) process of the type
b Gt = ￿g b Gt￿1 + ￿t (80)
with 0< ￿g < 1 and ￿t following a i.i.d. behavior.
Linearized Version of the Model
The Euler equation for the OPTC can be rewritten as deviation from the steady state as
b Co
t = Etb Co
t+1 ￿
￿
b Rt ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
(81)


















b Ct = ￿b Cr
t + (1 ￿ ￿)b Co
t (83)
b Nt = ￿ b Nr
t + (1 ￿ ￿) b No
t (84)
and after some algebra
c Wt = b Ct + ’ b Nt (85)
d MCt = c Wt (86)
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿(b Ct + ’ b Nt) (87)
With few iteractions the aggregate Euler equation becomes
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 ￿ a1
￿
b Rt ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
￿ a2Et￿ b Nt+1 + a3Et￿b Tr
t (88)









￿￿￿(!+!’) , ￿c is the ratio of consumption over total
output in steady state and ￿ = (￿￿c’ + !).The Production function
b Yt = b Nt (89)
12The derivation of the rule of thumb consumer as deviation from the steady state is in the Appendix
27the market clearing condition
b Yt = ￿c b Ct + b Gt (90)
Log linearizing eq (29) around the steady state with zero debt and a balanced primary budget we obtain
b Bt+1 = (1 + ￿)
￿
b Bt + b Gt + b Tt
￿
(91)
where ￿ = ￿￿1 ￿ 1 represents the steady state interest rate. Plugging the previous expression into the ￿scal
rule assumed above it yields
b Bt+1 = (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿b) b Bt + (1 + ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿g
￿ b Gt (92)




The dynamic system is then represented by (87),(88),(89),(90) and (92). In Table 1 are reported the parameter
values of the calibration of the Gali￿et Al(2007) baseline model.
Table 2: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
￿ 0:99 Discount factor
￿g 0:9 Shock persistence
￿￿ 1:5 Monetary parameter
￿b 0:2 Public debt ￿scal parameter
￿g 0:13 Public spending ￿scal parameter
’ 0:2 Frisch inverse elasticity of labour supply
￿ 0:75 Degree of price stickiness
￿ 1:23 Steady state mark up
￿ 0:5 Share of ROTC
￿c 0:75 Steady state share of G
￿ 0:01 Steady state interest rate
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Figure 1: Combination of ￿ and ’ that makes the economy non Keynesian (Black spot: Keynesian economy,
white area: non-Keynesian economy).










Figure 2: Determinacy area in the Keynesian side of the economy. (spot: determinacy, star: 1st order indeter-
minacy,circle:1st order instability, diamonds:2nd order instability)

























































Figure 3: IRF to a SD Public Spending Shock with active monetary policy (￿ = 1:2) and passive ￿scal
policy(￿1 = 0:2). Solid line ￿￿
2 = ￿1; crosses ￿￿
2 = 1:Horizontal axis: quarters.










Figure 4: Determinacy area in the non-Keynesian side of the economy. ￿2 = 0. (spot: determinacy, star: 1st
order indeterminacy,circle:1st order instability, diamonds:2nd order instability)










Figure 5: Determinacy area in the non-Keynesian side of the economy. ￿2 = 2. (spot: determinacy, star: 1st


























































Figure 6: IRF to a SD Public Spending Shock with active monetary policy (￿ = 1:2) and active ￿scal policy(￿1 =
￿0:2). Solid line ￿￿
2 = ￿1;crosses ￿￿
2 = 1:Horizontal axis: quarters.






















































Figure 7: IRF to a SD Public Spending Shock with passive monetary policy (￿ = 0:8) and passive ￿scal
policy(￿1 = 0:2). Solid line ￿￿
2 = ￿1; dashed line ￿￿
2 = 1:Horizontal axis: quarters.


















































Figure 8: IRF to a SD government spending shock of the baseline model with distortive taxation and Gal￿ et
al.(2007) parameters values. Solid line ￿￿
2 = 1, dashed line ￿￿
2 = ￿1:Horizontal axis: quarters.






















































Figure 9: IRF to a SD government spending shock in the Gal￿ et al. (2007) model. Horizontal axis: quarters.
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